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Law as the Object and Agent of Integration:  





In 1998 Armstrong wrote ‘Politics has discovered the European Court of Justice (ECJ). But 
has it discovered Law?’ (Armstrong 1998: 155) The answer to this question, I would argue, 
continues to be no. Though there has been some interest in the ECJ from a political science 
perspective (for example Garrett 1992, 1995; Mattli and Slaughter 1995, 1998, Stone Sweet 
2002, Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998, Conant 2007, Alter 1998, 2001, Haltern 2005, 2007), 
political science has not yet fully engaged with law as a discipline which can add to our 
understanding of EU integration and remains rather uncritical of law as a tool for integration 
(Armstrong 1998). Conversely, law has also shied away from analyses of EU integration 
which go beyond traditional legal doctrine. As a result genuine interdisciplinary analysis of 
legal integration is rare. As Alter and colleagues observed: 
 
‘Through a political science lens, legal scholarship seems anecdotal, lost in 
details, fatally flawed because the influences of extra-legal factors are not 
seriously explored, or unpersuasive because of a tendency to say that everything 
matters. Through a legal lens, political science work seems woefully 
misinformed about law and the legal process, simplistic if not crude, stating the 
obvious as if it were newly discovered, and ignorant or in denial of important 
cases that seem to disprove the argument made.’ (Alter et al. 2002: 114) 
 
Legal integration as a theory of integration which captures both the legal and the political is 
therefore underdeveloped and many of the questions asked of more traditional theories have 
not yet been asked of it. Its complexities are yet to be fully discovered, its problematics yet to 
be fully acknowledged and its gendered nature is yet to be fully appreciated. This chapter 
focuses on the latter point and seeks to address two key issues. Firstly, it seeks to outline why 
legal integration theory may be problematic when viewed from a gender perspective and 
secondly it seeks to show how a more nuanced and gender aware reading of legal integration 
can help us develop a fuller and more holistic picture of how EU (legal) integration works 
and how it allows us to uncover the hidden assumptions and biases inherent in the case law of 
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the ECJ. This chapter begins by sketching out what we mean by legal integration as it has 
been traditionally understood and it does so trying to take into account both legal and 
political science approaches and positions. The next part of the chapter then considers 
examples of gendered analysis of legal integration whereas the final part of this chapter offers 
a general critical assessment of legal integration from a gendered perspective. 
 
2. What is Legal Integration? 
Throughout this volume we have already explored a variety of integration theories and each 
of the accounts can be applied to integration using law/legal integration (for an example of 
how the theories might apply to the legal see Burley and Mattli 2006). For it to be theorised 
in its own right we first need to clarify and define at which level we are interested in the 
legal. We might seek to understand how the Treaties, as overarching legal frameworks, 
encourage, shape and seek to advance integration. We may therefore be interested in aspects 
of EU constitutional law and the role of constitutional law in integration. This approach has 
already received some attention in this volume in the sense that different approaches to 
understanding how treaties are negotiated have been explored (see, for example, van der 
Vleuten in this volume). Alternatively we might be interested in how the provisions of the 
Treaties are implemented through secondary legal provisions such as Directives and 
Regulations as well as through soft law measures such as communications and other policy 
documents. Again this approach is not unfamiliar in political science circles although it is 
perhaps less well developed than the constitutional approach. A third area of interest might be 
the interpretation of the legal provisions through the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) and the national courts of the member states. While the CJEU has received some 
attention as a political institution (see section 3) and the relationship between the European 
Court and national courts has been explored to a lesser extent, the case law of the CJEU and 
the reaction of national courts to that case law has not been examined or unpicked 
systematically in the context of EU integration. Finally, there is a further level of analysis 
which focuses on the socio-legal and in particular the impact of the legal provisions on the 
lived experience of citizens across the EU. Which focus we take or prioritise has implications 
for our understanding of EU integration from a legal perspective. This chapter focuses on the 
implementation and enforcement of EU law through the CJEU and the ECJ in particular for a 
number of reasons. First, the constitutional level as well as the implementation of law in 
secondary legislation and policy documents have already received some attention and are the 
most obvious areas where critiques already explored in this book can be applied to the legal. 
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Second, those levels involve the institutions and actors which have been recognised as 
political institutions and have been subjected to scrutiny as such; the CJEU has not received 
the same level of scrutiny and is treated (usually at least) as a legal and not a political 
institution. 
Joseph Weiler noted that law is both the object and the agent or instrument of 
integration:  while law is a product of the polity, the polity is also to some extent the creature 
of the law (Cappelletti et al. 1986: 4; Augenstein and Dawson 2012: 1). This captures well 
the nature of legal integration. Law and legal decisions are the result of legal integration as 
well as shaping it. It is therefore striking that political science textbooks rarely include 
separate sections, never mind chapters on legal integration even though most do include 
sections on the CJEU (notable exceptions include Bieling and Lerch 2012; Eilstrup- 
Sangiovanni 2006; Wiener and Diez 2009) and equally, legal textbooks rarely include 
detailed analysis of integration theories. Where legal integration issues are covered, they 
often focus on questions around judicial politics. Initial research drew heavily on principal-
agent theory and conceptualised the Court as an agent of the Member States doing the 
bidding of the most powerful States (see Garret 1992; Garrett and Weingast 1993, Burley and 
Mattli 1993). This however underestimates the level of independence the CJEU has exhibited 
and overestimates the control even the most powerful Member States exert over it (See for 
example Weiler 1994; Mattli and Slaughter 1995, 1998; Alter 2001). This might seem 
obvious to lawyers who are trained in the traditions of judicial independence and the rule of 
law but it is worthy of further discussion. The role of the ECJ in shaping the EU as we know 
it today and in pushing forward EU integration cannot be underestimated. Beginning with the 
decision in Van Gend en Loos in 1963, the ECJ turned what was for all intents and purposes 
an international legal framework into a new legal order which applied not only at 
international level between Member States but also to citizens of those Member States. The 
ECJ said: 
 
‘the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of 
which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and 
the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals’  
 
Not only is Van Gend en Loos a ‘famous stepping stone of legal doctrine, but [also] a 
breakthrough in the political relationship between member states and the club’ (Middelaar 
2013:49). Subsequent case law built on this stepping stone by firmly establishing the direct 
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applicability and supremacy of EU Law (Costa v ENEL (1964); Simmethal II (1978), 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (1970)) which then allowed the development of the 
principles of direct and indirect effect and finally that of State Liability (Francovich and 
Bonafaci v Italy (1990)). The series of cases therefore ‘represented, not just in their time but 
permanently, a giant leap on the road to European integration’ (Fennelly 2010: 44) because 
they resulted in the Member States having been ‘judicially tamed’ (Middelaar 2013: 80) and 
the ECJ having completed the transformation of the treaties 
 
‘from a set of horizontal legal arrangements between sovereign states into a 
vertically integrated legal regime conferring judicially enforceable rights and 
obligations on all legal persons and entities, public and private, within the EC 
territory’ (Stone Sweet 1998: 306).  
 
This vertically integrated legal regime allowed integration to occur at a much faster pace than 
it would otherwise have done because it allowed citizens, you and me, to enforce our EU law 
rights like we would enforce any other rights in our own national courts. And our own 
national courts were, for the most part happy to help us enforce our EU Law rights: 
 
‘For more than 40 years, this system has successfully managed the myriad 
complexities of legal integration. It has also heavily conditioned legislative 
outcomes in a wide range of policy domains, and it has helped to determine the 
course of European integration more generally. But the system has never been 
“perfected”. It has evolved continuously, often unpredictably, in response to a 
steady stream of challenges to supremacy arising from litigation of EC law in 
national courts’ (Stone Sweet 2010: 201) 
 
‘One of the most important aspects of the Court’s contribution has been its characterization of 
the relationship between the EU and national law’ (Shaw 2000b: 27) and the Preliminary 
Reference Procedure which, under what is now Article 267 TFEU, allows national courts to 
refer questions of EU law to the ECJ is a good example of how that relationship works 
between EU and national courts. Case law has clearly established that there must be a 
genuine dispute which is being heard in a national court or tribunal (Foglia (1991)) to which 
the interpretation of EU law is relevant and important (Dzodzi (1990)) and that the national 
court must put a precise and clearly phrased question to the ECJ (Telemarsicbruzzo (1993)). 
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The ECJ’s job is then to answer the question put to it, not to decide which party to the 
original case wins. One reason the ECJ has been so successful in driving EU integration 
forward and developing policy areas is the relatively high number of cases brought by 
citizens which raise EU law questions and which have therefore allowed the ECJ to interpret 
areas expansively. Gender equality is an example of a policy area where this can be seen 
clearly.  
A key case in terms of both the development of the doctrine of direct effect as a key 
legal principle and in terms of gender equality was Defrenne II. In this case an air hostess 
made a claim for equal pay with that of her male colleagues and the ECJ concluded that the 
EU Law in this area (what was then Article 119EEC) had direct effect and therefore allowed 
Ms Defrenne to bring her claim directly to the national court and rely on her EU law rights to 
do so. This is the first example of direct effect of a Treaty provision being applied in this way 
between an individual and a private organisation (the airline) leading Prechal to comment:  
 
‘Gender equality law has played a pivotal – in many respects pioneer – role in 
the field of enforcement of Community law in general and in particular for the 
protection of rights, which individuals derive from that law’ (Prechal 2005: 35) 
 
As a result of the decision in Defrenne II women all over Europe are able to ensure the 
consistent enforcement of EU Law in their own Member State and a series of cases confirms 
that the mechanism is effective in bringing about implementation of the provisions and the 
expansion of equality law. MacCarthys Ltd v Smith (1980), which concerned a claim for 
equal pay with an employee’s predecessor in the same job, is an example of an ECJ case 
which forced change in national legislation (this time the British Equal Pay Act 1970) but 
which is also forced other Member States to examine their equal pay laws. In Bilka Kaufhaus 
GmbH (1986) for example the ECJ concluded that it was unlawful to withhold pension 
contributions to part time workers because it breached the provisions on equal pay. The cases 
of Kalanke (1995) and Marschall (1997) show the balancing act which the ECJ has 
sometimes engaged in, in order to clarify the law. Both cases concern a complaint of sex 
discrimination brought by a man because of rules which require the appointment of women 
over men where they are otherwise underrepresented. In Kalanke the relevant rule was held 
to be discriminatory because it required the woman to be hired in all circumstances where the 
candidates were similarly qualified whereas in Marschall the women was to be hired unless 
there were factors which tipped the balance in the man’s favour. While Kalanke was seen as a 
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major setback for equality across the EU, Marschall restored some of the balance. What the 
cases did do however, was show clearly that across the EU a distinction must be drawn 
between positive action and positive discrimination with the former being lawful and the 
latter not. 
Research from individual Member States as well as research taking an overview (for 
example Alter and Vargas 2000; Anderson 2006; Schiek and Chege 2009) indicate that the 
ripple effect of decisions made at EU level is significant in shaping the development of the 
law at national level. Individual ECJ decisions impact not only on the Member State 
concerned but on all others too resulting in increasing integration, the potential for further 
litigation which in turn leads to further integration. 
Although there continues to be significant resistance against laws ‘imposed by 
Brussels’, EU citizens are also quick to enforce their rights, including EU law rights through 
the court system in their respective countries and in some instances civil society organisations 
have significant litigation strategies which support recourse to law (Cichowski 2007; 
Vanhalla 2011). Member States’ courts, particularly lower courts have been co-opted into the 
system of EU law enforcement because of EU law principles such as direct applicability and 
direct effect established by the ECJ, and in spite of some tensions between the ECJ and the 
highest courts of some member States (see Stone Sweet 2004; Kumm 2005; Maher 1996), 
‘the relationship between the Court of Justice and the national courts, including supreme 
courts, has worked reasonable well’ (Edwards 2010: 173). 
Whether we are seeing a move to what Keleman (2010) termed ‘Eurolegalims’, that is 
governance which is dominated by detailed legal rules which are backed up and enforced 
through litigation; or whether law is one part of a wide array of mechanisms which drive 
integration, what is clear is that law can and does play an important part in driving integration 
forward. We have seen this above in relation to gender equality law but examples could be 
drawn from almost any policy area the EU is involved in. 
 
3. Examples of gendered analysis of legal integration 
There is little work which combines legal analysis with political science methodology in 
order to examine legal integration and then also does so from a gender perspective. There are 
a number of studies which do include a legal dimension and which say something about legal 
integration even where they are not specifically focusing on an examination of EU 
integration. They are worth briefly outlining here to give a sense of the work which can be 
done in this area. What is striking as that these studies all recognise that a purely legal 
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analysis gender equality or areas impacting on gender equality is not likely to be able to fully 
explain what is driving the development of law and policy and the impact of that law. All of 
the work outlined below is very clear that law is about far more than the text of treaties, 
regulations and directives or the decision of the court; legal integration is also about how that 
law is understood, accepted or rejected, utilised and tested by Member States, EU institutions, 
individuals and civil society actors. The same bit of law can therefore be both the object and 
the agent of integration at the same time.  
Alter’s work on the ECJ is an excellent example of scholarship which bridges the 
disciplinary divide between law and political science and several examples have already been 
cited. Together with Vargas she provides a useful explanation of how organisations can use 
law and litigation in particular to bring about legal change which will have an impact in the 
home state as well as across the EU. The article focuses on the UK’s Equal Opportunities 
Commission and its litigation strategy though the 1980s which was highly successful in using 
EU law in order to being about changes in national provisions (Alter and Vargas 2000).  
The importance of organisations and civil society in particular in mobilising law is 
picked up in the work of Rachel Cichowski. She uses the examples of gender equality law as 
well as environmental protection to show how ‘an international treaty governing economic 
cooperation became a quasi-constitutional polity granting individual rights and public 
inclusion’ (Cichowski 2007:1). Her work is underpinned by detailed empirical work which 
gives it a rich evidence base and allows her to fully explore how and why integration has 
moved forward in a particular way in a particular policy area. Her work highlights that the 
interaction between civil society and the legal arena has been key particularly in the area of 
gender equality. 
Catherine Hoskyns’ work in which she sets out a feminist perspective on the EU’s 
equality policies (Hoskyns 1996) is worth considering for  no other reason than that it is one 
of the early explorations of this area of law. She notes that women have ‘raised their voices 
and used legal channels and policy instruments … to generate social change in ways 
undreamed of by the pragmatists who drafted the Treaty of Rome.’ (Hoskyns 1996: 209-210) 
While the majority of her work centres on the political institutions and their work, she also 
provides a detailed consideration of the ECJ and in particular her analysis of the Defrenne 
case is insightful and useful. Hoskyns, in her analysis of the case law draws a distinction 
between the cases related to the employment sphere where she suggests that the ECJ has been 
innovative and the decisions far reaching and the area of social security where she finds the 
court to be rather more conservative. If her analysis holds true then we would expect to see 
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equality law in the employment sphere to be rather more advanced than a gendered 
understanding of social security provisions. Hoskyns work therefore highlights the 
importance of law as a part of moving gender equality forward but also brings to our attention 
the importance of gendering cases which are not directly about non-discrimination or equality 
in order to highlight the hidden biases and assumptions. 
Jo Shaw’s work has emphasised the dual legal and political role of the ECJ and this is 
a useful starting point for considering how legal integration works. As a legal institution, the 
ECJ’s decisions and the way in which they interpret EU law are perhaps the most important 
aspects in need of investigation whereas as a political institution the court’s interaction with 
all the other institutions and Member States’ courts is at least as important then the published 
judgment. Only by considering both together can we really understand how legal integration 
works and what the role of law and the role of the court is. The other important issue raised 
by Shaw in this context is the fact that many of the Courts decisions can be seen as 
opportunist rather than as necessarily feminist or gender aware. She notes that the court has 
‘cloaked itself in something akin to a feminist cloak almost always only where some gain can 
be obtained in terms of reinforcing its own legitimacy within the system’ (Shaw 2000c: 142). 
Arguably therefore the court is not gender aware as much as aware of its own position within 
the EU institutional framework. 
The work discussed above is all focused on gender equality law within the EU. To 
fully appreciate what gendered approaches to work on EU legal integration can add it is 
worth also considering work which is not explicitly focused on gender equality law. There 
are several examples which look at closely related issues such as mothering in the EU 
(Guerrina 2005) or families and family law in the EU (McGlynn 2009). The work of Ackers, 
over a series of projects based on detailed empirical work has considered the situation of 
migrant women (Ackers 2009), migrant retirees (Ackers and Dwyer 2002) and migrant 
children (Ackers and Stalford 2004) as well as highly skilled migrants specifically including 
women (Ackers and Gill 2008) in the EU. While her work is not specifically examining 
integration, her work does fully explore the lived experience of her chosen research 
participants and charts their experience of the EU legal framework. She adds an important 
dimension to work which provides an analysis of legal doctrine and work which considers 
integration in a theoretical context, by showing how this integration is experienced through 
the creation and enforcement of legal rights in specific political contexts. 
All the work introduced above suggests that a gendered reading of EU law can add to our 
understanding of (legal) integration by highlighting dynamics and issues which otherwise 
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remain hidden. The next section sets out a gendered critique in more detail in order to show 
more clearly what such an approach can bring. 
 
4. Applying a gendered critique to legal integration 
Legal Integration, considered from a gender perspective raises a number of issues and 
concerns which are worth considering carefully. The first, and perhaps most obvious point we 
need to consider is who is driving the legal integration; who are the people making decisions 
which drive integration forward? The ECJ is made up of 28 judges, 5 of whom are women, 
and nine Advocate Generals, 3 of whom are women. As far back as 1996 the European 
Commission noted the importance of gender balance across institutions: 
 
‘The balanced participation of women and men in decision-making is considered 
crucial to the legitimacy of representative and advisory bodies and therefore also 
our European democracies … The judiciary influences society at all levels and it 
is therefore crucial that women form a significant presence within it’. 
(Anasagasti et al 1999: 7) 
 
Rackley (2013: 165) argued further that ‘who the judge is matters, since it will determine 
both the way the judge sets about deciding cases and the substantive conclusions they reach’; 
and one of the reasons that who the judge is matters is because ‘personal experiences affect 
what facts judges choose to see’ (Sotomayor 2002: 92). Judges with different backgrounds 
are likely to have different views and while different views may sometimes be in conflict and 
give rise to tensions, Rackley argues that: 
 
‘the promise of a diverse judiciary is not the promise of a multiplicity of 
approaches and values fighting for recognition. But of a judiciary enriched by its 
openness to viewpoints previously marginalised and of decision-making which 
is better for being better informed’ (Rackley 2013: 177). 
 
This is, in an EU context, actually not controversial. After all the Treaties, in Article 19TEU, 
insist that each Member State appoints one judge and it is unquestioningly accepted that this 
is important. Kenney highlights this by questioning ‘whether Ireland would accept a decision 
by the court that it had to allow the advertisement of abortion services available in London if 
no Irish judge had sat on that case?’ (Kenney 2002: 266). The importance of retaining one 
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judge per Member State even in the enlarged EU of 28 is clear: politically nothing else would 
be acceptable and the legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of those Member States without 
judicial representation is likely to be reduced significantly. Why then is it acceptable to 
expect the Union’s women to accept decisions made by male dominated Courts? 
A concrete example from a key area in legal integration; that of EU Citizenship may 
help to show why a gendered interpretation of law highlights the hidden biases and 
assumptions. European Union Citizenship, so the ECJ declared, was to be the fundamental 
status of national of the EU Members States (Grzelczyk 2001). Some have argued that it was 
never intended to provide concrete rights but instead was designed to bring the people closer 
to the Union and make it meaningful in other than just economic terms (see Currie 2009). EU 
Citizenship decisions have had a significant impact on integration shaping the way citizens 
can move within the Union and the rights they can rely on. On first glance Citizenship case 
law appears gender neutral at worst and some may be cautiously optimistic that gender issues 
are being taken into consideration. For example in the case Martinez Sala (1985), the ECJ 
agreed that there did not always have to be a link between an EU migrant carrying out some 
sort of economic activity in the form of employment or self-employment and their right to 
receive social advantages. In addition carers seem to have received some recognition in EU 
citizenship case law which can be seen as a positive step towards gender equality (for 
examples the cases of Chen (2005), Ibrahim and Teixera (2010)).  
However looking at two cases decided in quick succession in 2011 highlights how 
gendering Court decisions highlights issues not otherwise visible. In 2011 the ECJ handed 
down its judgement in the case of Ruiz Zambrano. The case was quickly followed by the 
Court’s decision in McCarthy. In some ways the facts are quite similar. In Ruiz Zambrano a 
residence and work permit was granted to a third country national man on the basis of his 
children’s EU citizenship status (for detailed analysis see Guth and Mowlam 2012). In 
McCarthy a residence permit was refused to a Jamaican man married to a dual British-Irish 
citizen. In both cases the legal issues is whether a right to reside in the EU can be derived by 
a third country national from an EU national who has always resided in their home state. In 
Zambrano the answer was yes, in McCarthy the answer was no. The difference appears to be 
that holding otherwise would oblige Mr Zambrano and his family to leave the territory of the 
EU and thus deprive the children of their EU rights. In McCarthy the refusal did apparently 
not mean that Mrs McCarthy was deprived of her Treaty rights. However, there are other 
differences which when considered from a gender perspective have significant consequences 
and other questions which are important if we are to gender the citizenship case law. Mr 
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Zambrano had been working and supporting himself and was able to so again if allowed to 
legally work in Belgium. Mrs McCarthy had never worked and was dependent on state 
assistance. Furthermore the two cases read together suggest that there has to be a relationship 
of carer for the derived residence rights to apply. This is not something made explicit in the 
judgment but it is something seen in previous cases (Chen (2005), Ibrahim and Teixera 
(2010)) – where there is a carer of an EU national child, residence and associated rights are 
granted. The ECJ seems rather more sceptical of partners and spouses in general: 
 
‘Thus, whereas in Zambrano the company (and indeed authorisation to work) of 
a carer-parent was considered essential for the continued residence of the citizen 
on the territory of the Union, in McCarthy the same logic did not apply to the 
company of a spouse’ (Coutts 2011: online). 
 
While the acknowledgement of the importance of carers’ rights is important and enhances 
women’s rights it is not something which the Court has done in order to enhance equality. In 
fact, the cases seem to require women to do it all: They need to be able to work and ideally 
work in a Member State other than their own in order to benefit from the right to have their 
third country family member join them and if there is a relationship of caring present, 
chances of rights being granted seem to increase dramatically. What then if, in the Zambrano 
case, Mr Zambrano had not featured? What if it was Mrs Zambrano who had claimed the 
right of residence? What if she had not worked because she had been looking after the (EU 
national) children? Would the reasoning have been the same? What  if Mr Zambrano had still 
been in Colombia and had asked to join his family in Belgium? Would he have been granted 
residence in the way that McCarthy’s Jamaican husband was not? From a gender perspective 
all these questions matter. Why Mrs McCarthy did not work matters from a gender 
perspective, who looked after the Zambrano children may also matter. But none of these 
questions were asked or considered by the Court. 
Importantly of course, some may argue that the Court never got the opportunity to 
consider those issues because it is simply asked to consider the question(s) put to it by the 
referring court. This is worthy of further examination on two points. First the possibility of 
applying a gendered reading of the question referred and thus using a gendered analysis of 
what facts and legal issues are relevant to deciding the case is something which is open to the 
Court. Secondly, this point does highlight that the Court is dependent on national courts. In 
this regard, the first thing to note is that any court, even the lowest, can refer a question of EU 
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law. This arguably is a positive for gender equality as lower courts across Member States 
tend to have more women judges than Appeal or Constitutional Courts (with some notable 
exceptions such as Bulgaria (CEPEJ 2012). If it is accepted that women judges are more 
likely to acknowledge that questions arising are gendered (see Rackley 2006, Hale and 
Hunter 2008) or put the other way round that gender is relevant to the questions being 
addressed, she might also be more willing to recognise the need to refer questions where 
other (male) judges may not see a gender issue which needs to be addressed and be less 
willing to engage with EU law to address the question. However, how effective this process 
is will depend very much on the extent to which judges in national courts are willing to 
engage with the EU system and the extent to which that is accepted within the Member State. 
As far back as 1999 Tesoka noted in the context of discussion of judicial politics and their 
impact on national equality structures that 
 
‘Despite the presence of equality litigation procedures in all EU member states, 
it seems that certain national systems are more ‘open’ than others and better 
equipped to provide effective and easy access to justice’ (Tesoka 1999: 14). 
 
The extent to which gender questions are seen as relevant and in addition the extent to which 
EU law is seen as a way to help address gender questions will also vary from Member State 
to Member State. MacRae (2010) explores the disjuncture between the gender equality 
rhetoric and myth at EU level and its translation or implementation into national contents. 
She highlights that ‘where, however, the Member State’s gender narrative differs 
dramatically from the liberal frame advanced by the EU, it is unlikely that the full policy 
gains will be transposed into national legislation’. (MacRae 2010; 171) 
On the one hand this might be expected to lead to increased litigation questioning 
whether or not EU law has been correctly implemented but that presumes that the EU policy 
has in fact taken the form of legislation. In addition, even where a legal challenge might be 
possible, the differing gender narrative might well act as a deterrent to bringing an action 
because gender roles, what constitutes acceptable or unacceptable behaviour or action and 
expectations might differ considerably and because national judges are of course part of the 
national context and rhetoric (and less likely to be women). Nonetheless the fact that all 
courts can refer a question is a positive which can be used by EU citizens to argue for a more 
nuanced and gender aware reading of EU legal integration where the opportunity arises. The 
problem is though that such an opportunity has to arise. The preliminary reference procedure 
13 
 
requires that there is a genuine legal dispute between two (or more) parties and that the 
interpretation of EU Law is necessary to resolve that dispute. This means that hypothetical 
questions cannot be referred and interest groups cannot engineer a disagreement in order to 
get a ruling on a particular issue. The issue has to come up in a dispute and the issue has to 
require the interpretation of EU Law. This means that some EU law has to exist in the first 
place. In some cases of course this is not controversial and in areas such as equal pay or non-
discrimination the legal provisions and associated case law are well known and the positive 
impact on the women of the EU are clear. In other areas, this becomes more difficult – EU 
citizenship is one such area and in particular the free movement of persons is full of examples 
where decisions have been made which have gendered implications which could have more 
fully informed the judgments but did not. Shaw’s work (2000a, 2000c, 2005) for example 
suggests that ECJ decisions and EU policy generally privilege certain EU citizens over others 
and construct gender roles in certain ways. The EU model itself appears to be built on full 
labour market participation by all including women as workers and mothers and men as the 
main earners in a heterosexual family set up (see also Lombardo and Verloo 2009; Maier and 
Lombardo 2008; Guth 2011; O’Brien 2009, 2013). 
The Citizens’ Rights Directive (Directive 2004/38) provides further examples of how 
a gendered reading can make a difference to our understanding of what rights can and should 
be granted to EU migrants. Residence in another Member State is lawful as long as the 
person moving is economically active or can show that they are not a burden on the host state 
and those who are lawfully resident are entitled to equal treatment with host nationals when it 
comes to social assistance. While this suggests the possibility of an approach broader than 
worker/economically active status, it still highlights the economic roots of free movement 
and questions whether we can really speak of citizenship in its truest sense. As Chalmers and 
colleagues note: 
 
‘Yet the practical effect of these conditions is that ‘expensive’ members of 
society do not enjoy free movement rights. […] Union Citizenship is a 
citizenship for all Europeans who are not poor or sick’ (Chalmers et al. 2014: 
478). 
 
The case of Baumbast (2002) serves as an illustration that economic self-sufficiency is at the 
forefront of the Courts mind. The ECJ held that limitations on residence rights ‘are applied in 
compliance with general principles of EU law and, in particular, the principle of 
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proportionality’(Baumbast at para 94). Although Mr Baumbast might not have had the 
required medical insurance in the UK, he did have medical insurance in Germany, where the 
family travelled to receive any treatment. Mr Baumbast and his family were not reliant on the 
host state for any financial benefits or help and in fact Mr Baumbast had previously engaged 
in economic activity, thus contributing to the economy in the UK. Taking all those matters 
into consideration the ECJ felt that denying the family their right to residence was not 
proportionate: 
 
‘the Court’s use of proportionality has injected a greater degree of flexibility into 
the black-letter provisions and allowed it to extend residence (and equal 
treatment) rights to some individuals who fall outside of the formal legislative 
regime’(Currie 2008: 168). 
 
The economic rationale is clear – the family would not be a burden on the host state. Some 
financial solidarity between Member States can and should be expected in the EU – just as 
long as citizens do not expect too much. We are therefore left with a situation where social 
assistance under Directive 2004/38 is available to EU citizens who are lawfully resident in 
another Member States, either as workers or because they have sufficient resources and 
sickness insurance; those who are not economically active or self-sufficient are not entitled to 
help. This makes no sense at is seems to be offering help to those least likely to need it and 
denying it to those most likely to require assistance. Applying a gender lens highlights a 
number of issues. Women are less likely to fall into the privileged category of economically 
active than men are, leaving them as either dependent for their EU free movement rights on 
husbands (or possibly partners or sons) who do fall within that category or unable to claim 
their fundamental status as EU citizens at all. This is partly due to a narrow interpretation of 
economic activity as linked to employment or self-employment ignoring other areas such as 
volunteering and, in particular, care. 
A more nuanced and gender aware reading of the EU law provisions could lead to 
different results, a different way of thinking about who, as an EU citizen, is deserving of 
rights. The work of Charlotte O’Brien, though not explicitly labelled feminist or gendered, 
gives us an insight into what this might look like. In 2009 she argued 
 
‘in favour of an integrated interpretation approach: that the reach of free 
movement rights should be defined according to a duty of both formal and 
15 
 
substantive equal treatment. The scope of migrant work should be subject to the 
same principles as the content of Community law. In this way some asymmetry 
could be redressed; not by attempting to Europeanise the social, but by 
socializing the (already European) economic’. (O’Brien 2009: 1107) 
 
This may not sound particularly gendered but has big implications for allowing the provision 
of care and voluntary work as well as a whole host of characteristics all EU citizens possess 
to be taken into account when considering rights. In 2011 and 2012 O’Brien presents similar 
arguments in relation to volunteers (O’Brien 2011a) and free movement and the development 
of EU discrimination provisions arguing that 
 
‘An alternative approach to economic rationality is here advocated, in which the 
choice is not between economic utilitarianism and individualistic human rights, 
but a choice between definitions of “utility”, a choice that should take account of 
the long-term interests of society.’ (O’Brien 2011b: 27) 
 
And finally in 2013, O’Brien reminds us why holistic approaches to evaluating law and 
policy areas as well as concepts and ideas and to approaching EU integration in different 
areas as a whole rather than considering each individual step in isolation are important: 
 
‘EU citizenship is the subject of incremental and painstaking construction. In 
allowing ourselves to get caught up with dissecting each separate instalment that 
comes with each new case, we risk accepting without scrutiny what should be a 
controversial ideological framework – that of an economic/market citizenship. 
Within this framework, rights do not attach to personhood; rather rights are 
triggered, interpreted, delineated and weighed according to a miscellany of 
conditions. As a result, claimants can face “social welfare cliff edges” – tipping 
them over the edge of the cliff, from full protection to none – on the basis of 
apparently arbitrary tricks of circumstance’. (O’Brien 2013: 1643) 
 
A gendered analysis of EU legal integration allows us to not fall into that trap and to 
challenge the ideological framework of economic/market citizenship within which much of 
(legal) integration is framed. A gendered reading also allows us to take a more holistic 
approach, particularly if both legal and political science approaches are acknowledged: We 
16 
 
can acknowledge the importance of the individual legal decisions and the overall legal 
framework as well as all the actors involved in those decisions and the impact the decisions 
and the framework will have at EU and national level, in terms of further developing policy 
and advancing integration.  
 
5. Conclusions 
EU Legal Integration as a theoretical idea informed fully by both law and political science is 
in its infancy. Work has been done by political scientists and some work has been done by 
lawyers but interdisciplinary work is needed and gender scholars with an interest in the EU 
are well placed to drive this work forwards. This chapter has highlighted that we should not 
fall into the trap of seeing the legal as something objective, rational and neutral because it is, 
just like anything else, gendered. They way treaties are negotiated, the way secondary 
legislation is arrived at, and the way decisions are referred to and then made by the Court all 
have gendered implications. The make-up of the court has consequences, the preliminary 
reference procedure has consequences and yet there is almost no research exploring these 
issues in any systematic way. Legal integration needs examining closely from all sorts of 
perspectives but a gendered analysis can be a valuable first step to more fully understanding 
how legal integration impacts on a wide variety of EU citizens and it therefore is an important 
step towards fully understanding EU integration as a whole. In particular a gendered analysis 
of EU law and its role in integration allows us to move away from the market focused 
analysis so often seen and take account of all actors, their priorities and preferences and the 
impact they can have on the development and implementation of EU law and policy. 
Combining legal and political analysis and adding a gender lens to those approaches 
highlights that while law plays an important role in EU integration and while the ECJ 
undoubtedly created the legal framework which ensure citizens have a significant stake in the 
integration process as well as opportunities to shape it, using law to drive integration forward 
is as much a political process as it is a legal one. The focus on law alone is what makes legal 
integration theories problematic because just focusing on the legal texts and court decision 
only tells us part of the story about integration. The outcome of case law might result in 
Member States having to change their national laws in order to comply but they tell us little 
about why the cases were brought in the first place or exactly what the impact will be. 
Because gendered approaches tend to have a wider focus, gendered reading of legal 
integration theories allows us to see law as more than just the legal text and decisions but as 
the entire process which begins with law making and ends with an understanding of how 
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people engage with the legal provisions and how they impact on EU citizens. A gendered 
reading helps us to understand how 
 
‘The EU’s shift towards more participatory, reflexive or fragmented forms of 
legal rule does not simply displace “integration through law”, but recursively re-
evaluates and conditions its very meaning. This sense of EU law’s sustained 
ability to steer European societies and to reinvent itself in response to new 
political and societal challenges […] may be a central factor in explaining the 




1. What is legal integration? 
2. What is the role of law in EU integration? 
3. What was the role of law in advancing gender equality law? 
4. What can a gender lens tell us about the role of law in EU integrations? 
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